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Abstract Humans use metaphors to explore their relation-
ship with nature. Our ability to make and understand
metaphors appears to be an automatic cognitive process,
one that likely evolved along with our ability to create and
understand language. Because metaphors are processed
automatically, without conscious appraisal, they can be used to
rapidly communicate, or manipulate. Applying theories of
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science to literary texts,
we explored the role of animal metaphors in the making and
partaking of stories in the context of a course in environmental
studies. We investigated how humans are animals and yet use
culture to shield themselves from this reality. We read and
analyzed literature in which animal metaphors are central, such
as Honoré de Balzac’s short story Passion in the Desert and
Langdon Smith’s poem “Evolution.” Throughout the course,
the overarching theme is that animal metaphors are powerful
tools for framing our relationship with the environment and
that they can be best understood in the context of humans as
evolved animals.
Keywords Metaphor . Narrative . Literature . Blended
space . Human universals . Theory of mind . Animate
monitoring system
How do we distinguish humans from animals? This
question, meant to provoke discussion, was put to students
on the first day of “Animal Metaphors,” an intermediate-
level course designed for the multidisciplinary environmen-
tal studies major at Vassar College. Team-taught by a
specialist of French literature and a scientist whose dual
specialization is biology and cognitive science, the course
draws on concepts from cognitive science and evolutionary
psychology to reframe questions of human–animal identity
encountered in imaginative literature as well as everyday
life. To permit the exchange of information and ideas
between students of varied backgrounds in the humanities
or natural sciences, we developed a conceptual bridge using
analytic approaches from cognitive science and literary
studies. That bridge is “animal metaphors.”
In this paper, we discuss the structure of the course,
metaphor and the evolved process of understanding
metaphors, the conceptual tools needed to analyze meta-
phors critically in their textual and evolutionary contexts,
and examples of how those conceptual tools were applied
to the analysis of texts.
Overview of the Course
Though a common term in literary studies, we intend
animal metaphors to represent our particular approach to
evolutionary studies. We begin with the premise that humans
are animals, primates that share physical, behavioral, and
neural machinery with other primate species. Humans have
the cognitive ability to make and understand metaphors, and
they create animal metaphors in order to cognitively model
and represent other agents, including other humans, in our
ongoing struggle for existence in a rapidly changing environ-
ment. Paradoxically, the evolved use of animal metaphors to
fashion a relationship with the environment allows humans to
conceptualize themselves as non-animals. As metaphorically
construed non-animals—specially created, for example
humans—are then more likely to harm that to which they
supposedly don’t belong: the environment. This is the grand
theme of the course, and one that requires the explanatory
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power of evolution for understanding both how and why
humans so often represent themselves in opposition to
animals. As we examine imaginative literature and film, we
keep in mind that environmental problems can require an
evolutionary understanding of ourselves. Human beings are
“literary animals” with an evolved tendency to make and
partake in storytelling, and we rely on metaphors to tell one
another stories about animals in relation to ourselves.
Structure
Divided into modules that introduce works of literature and
film in tandem with various theories of evolutionary
psychology and cognitive science, the course is structured
to begin and end with the problem of defining and
representing humans in relation to animals.
The first module focuses on the role of metaphor in our
conceptualizations of the world and ourselves. After
introducing metaphor in relation to selected evolutionary
theories of mind, emotion, and behavior, we examine a
study that seems to provide initial empirical support for the
following hypothesis (Goldenberg et al. 2001): “…being an
animal is threatening because it reminds people of their
vulnerability to death” (427).
The second module develops more thoroughly the idea
of human universals. Evolution can explain the mechanisms
by which we are affectively drawn to or repelled by animals
and is behind the cognitive architecture allowing us to
represent animals according to the different roles or
purposes we assign to them. Students learn to analyze
ways in which such universals participate in the production
and reception of narrative literature and film, whose
metaphors can mediate the anxiety we may have about
being animals.
The third module turns to the use of animal metaphors in
a broad range of discourses and representations that address
environmental issues. Ultimately, metaphors that deny or
distance us from natural realities can participate in the
decisions we make—or fail to make—concerning the
environment. By the course’s conclusion, students have
acquired new knowledge and tools for exploring the
problem of human–animal identity by learning to under-
stand and analyze the very representational practices we
engage in from an evolutionary perspective.
Metaphor as Categorical Assertion
Seen as a central feature of human cognition that has
evolved with the development of language (Pinker 1993),
the ability to conceptualize one entity in terms of another
allows us to communicate through metaphor. Oxford
English Dictionary defines metaphor as “the figure of
speech in which a name or descriptive term is transferred to
some object different from, but analogous to, that to which
it is properly applicable.” Though often understood as a
device employed by poets, metaphor is part of everyday
speech. We use constructions for motion in physical space
to express changes in state-space (Lakoff and Johnson
1980), as when we say “Humans have risen above
animals.” In poetics, metaphor is often distinguished from
simile in that it asserts properties of one entity in terms of
another entity without the use of “like” or “as” (“My boss is
a dragon” vs. “My boss is like a dragon”). The link between
the two entities may be established explicitly using a
linking verb, or, in the case of implied metaphor, a different
verb or part of speech functions to establish the connection
(“My boss is spitting fire”; “I’d like to punch his snout in”).
Though our course embraces definitions of metaphor
that include non-verbal as well as verbal analogies between
different entities, we begin with Glucksberg’s (2003) more
restrictive definition of metaphor as categorical assertion.
Informed by reaction time experiments, Glucksberg permits
us to explore empirically the impact of metaphors that
categorize human beings. Comparing the statement “My
lawyer is a shark” with “My lawyer is like a shark,”
Glucksberg argues that in the simile form, “the word
‘shark’ refers to the literal predatory fish. In metaphor form,
‘shark’ refers to the superordinate category of predatory
creatures that is exemplified by the literal shark” (95).
Glucksberg’s experiments indicate that people do not need
to derive an initial, literal interpretation from metaphorical
assertions: “Metaphors are not understood via a property-
matching comparison process. Instead, they are generally
understood directly as categorical assertions” (92).
The idea of metaphor as categorical assertion has been
expanded by research in linguistics, philosophy, and
cognitive science. In these fields, metaphor is not just a
figure of speech. It is a process of “conceptual blending”
that results in “the creation of new meaning” (Fauconnier
and Turner 2003, 39). Drawing upon Black’s (1962)
interactionist view of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson’s
(1980) work on conceptual metaphor, Fauconnier and
Turner (1995) propose that “Structure from two or more
input mental spaces is projected onto a separate ‘blended’
space, which inherits partial structure from the inputs, and
has emergent structure of its own” (183). Thus, the
statement My lawyer is a shark creates an imaginary space
in which shark and lawyer no longer mean what they each
meant separately; instead, they interact and emerge as a
new concept: “It’s only within the blend that the intended
structure emerges” (Fauconnier and Turner 2003, 23).
Metaphors are central to cognition, though we are
usually unaware of how much our conceptualizations
engage them (Hogan 2003). To quote Lakoff and Johnson
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(1980): “Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in
nature.” (3). Lakoff proposes that becoming aware of how we
metaphorically conceptualize or “frame” problems, including
environmental crises (Lakoff 2009), is crucial to our ability to
find appropriate solutions, particularly if the “frames”
promote attitudes of indifference to or autonomy from
nature. Pinker (2007) objects to what he considers Lakoff’s
extremism: “People can not only ignore metaphors, but can
question and discount them, and analyze which aspects are
applicable and which should be ignored” (249).
Glucksberg’s experiments suggest that humans immediate-
ly process metaphors. The initial processing of metaphors
appears to be done by a mental module of the kind described
by Fodor (1983): an obligatory, rapid, domain-specific
(language) set of fixed neural architecture. Pinker is correct
that after the automatic modular processing of the metaphor,
metaphors can be analyzed. This secondary analysis is the
process we teach throughout the course. Our analytic process
parallels that of Lakoff (2008) which is based on the neural
theory of language. Without invoking Lakoff’s notational
formalisms, we examine the factors that may discourage people
from recognizing their automatic processing of metaphors,
primary processes which are as much a part of our evolved
psychological features as our ability to analyze metaphors.
Metaphors can serve as analogies, mapping from the
known source to the conceptually new target (Lakoff, 2008;
Gentner and Bowdle, 2008), enabling us to understand
something new in terms of something more familiar, as
when a doctor tells a patient “Your thyroid is a furnace and
your pituitary gland is the thermostat.” Metaphors in
science serve an explanatory role. The value of a particular
scientific metaphor, whether it is a verbal or visual
representation (such as a molecule depicted as globes with
connecting sticks), is determined from whether or not it is
consistent with experimental results (Brown 2003). In non-
scientific contexts especially, however, metaphor can be
used to persuade and manipulate, tapping into positive or
negative emotions and networks of associated ideas in the
listener, as when a public figure is accused of being “a
snake in the grass,” or the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
is dubbed “Obama’s Katrina.”
Non-scientists, and sometimes scientists themselves, can
mistake a scientific metaphor for the literal reality, which is
why some people have called for the term “global heat
trap” to replace “greenhouse effect” (Brown, 2003). This
reification of metaphor is not surprising given the purported
neural basis of the largely unconscious mechanisms for
treating metaphors from different kinds of sensory sources,
or modalities, as equivalent in the multimodal space of
cognitive simulation (Barsalou, 2008). Observing that
“greenhouse” evokes notions of pleasant warmth and
flourishing life, Brown suggests it is no coincidence that a
Wall Street Journal editorial hailed the new “lush plant
growth” generated by warmer climates as a gift from the
industrial revolution. Though one may intend, or claim
one’s intention is merely to explain something using
metaphor, the metaphors we use can get misinterpreted or
stir strong emotion that interferes with rational analysis and
policy decisions congruent with the laws of nature. This
affective power of metaphors is consistent with the module
model that we automatically process metaphors and that
their initial processing is not open to willful alteration.
Moreover, in the initial processing stages, metaphors
created in different sensory modalities appear to use
different neural pathways; for example, non-verbal meta-
phors, compared to verbal ones, are more implicit, more
universal, and more emotive (Forceville 2008).
Creating Fictions
An understanding of the manipulative power of metaphor is
not new to rhetoricians; as John Locke (2004) observed in
1698, “…all the artificial and figurative application of words
eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate
wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the
judgment and so, indeed, are perfect cheats.” Research in
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science elucidates the
part metaphor plays in misleading our judgment (Gibbs 2008;
Hogan 2003). We humans, and other animals, have a
remarkable capacity for denial (Wright 1994). Although our
ability to discern is adaptive, so too is our ability to embrace
falsehoods or distortions of reality in many ways and circum-
stances. For instance, we may have evolved to copy the
behavior of others in a group and to adopt the group’s majority
viewpoint even if it runs counter to our own because of a risk
that asserting independent judgment could result in loss of
status or, worse, complete exclusion from the group. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging has shown that this tendency,
called “conformity bias,” can affect even our perception of the
world when we are in a social setting (Berns et al. 2005).
Related to conformity bias is “confirmation bias,” or the
tendency to believe information that matches our precon-
ceptions. We have an innate capacity to notice the evidence
that most supports what we already want to believe
(Nickerson 1998). Like conformity bias, confirmation bias
can work in conjunction with other apparently evolved
tendencies, such as prejudice against individuals identified
as members of an outgroup. Sometimes, we just don’t want
to be found in the wrong, and that, too, may be part of our
evolved psychology (Haidt 2006).
Other factors can create fictions that impair our
discernment, such as the strong affect and networks of
meaning associated with particular metaphors. Whenever
we activate one lexical entry, other linked lexical entries are
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partially activated, becoming “more readily accessible,
more easily activated, than entries that are simply latent in
long-term memory” (Hogan 2003, 47). This lexical process
is called “priming.” If the word arouses emotion, “activa-
tion will spread out along its connections, thus priming and
bringing into readiness…associated ideas and memories”
(Hogan 2003, 111). Often, such meaning networks and
emotions work in concert with the various other innate
human tendencies to deny or distort that which one might
otherwise discern as the truth. For instance, some meta-
phors can tap into the fear of being dominated. In a society
that demonizes female ambition, stereotypes of women as
cunning predators can be activated when reporters say a
female politician was engaged in a “catfight” or “cackled”
when she laughed. To quote Lakoff (2009): “We think,
mostly unconsciously, in terms of systems of structures
called ‘frames.’ Each frame is a neural circuit, physically in
our brains. We use our systems of frame-circuitry to
understand everything, and we reason using frame-internal
logics. Frame systems are organized in terms of values, and
how we reason reflects our values, and our values
determine our sense of identity. In short, framing is a big
deal.” Lakoff’s frames are not unlike Fodor’s modules,
neurally based and capable of rapid, automatic processing.
Because both frames and modules are thought to be neural
circuits, and circuits are heritable (Cosmides and Tooby
1997), any frame or module may be adaptive. As putative
adaptations, it is likely that many frames and modules
evolved in the common ancestor of humans and other
mammals; our ability to understand the emotional disposi-
tion of dogs and vice versa (Bekoff 2007), for example,
suggests that we share affective frames.
Broadening Definitions of Metaphor
Thus far, we have adduced examples that conform to
Glucksberg’s strict definition of metaphor as a categorical
assertion. We propose, based on the burgeoning evidence of
the fundamental role of metaphor in thought (for review,
see Gibbs, 2008), that any sort of figurative language,
including simile, may potentially produce or approximate the
effects of a categorical assertion in the minds of people
whose “frame systems” are activated. By the same token, a
frequently used metaphor can have the weaker impact of a
simile. Much may depend upon the biases and frame systems
of the listener, and the power of the context to engender
strong emotion, as in the case of a political contest.
During the 2008 presidential race, Caroline Kennedy used
simile in the title of her pro-Obama editorial: “A President
Like My Father.” The impact of her message on readers may
easily have been: “Obama is another John. F. Kennedy.” On
the other hand, many reporters used simile to characterize a
statement Obama made that used the formal structure of
metaphor. Comparing the McCain–Palin policies to those of
the outgoing president’s, Obama had said: “You can put
lipstick on a pig, but it’s still a pig.” One headline the
following day read: “Obama saidMcCain–Palin proposals are
like putting lipstick on a pig.” In contrast, another headline
announced “Obama: Palin is a pig with lipstick,” not only
rejecting simile but also dispensing with Obama’s stated
object of comparison (his opponents’ policies).
The evocation of lipstick by both sides calls attention to
the power of visual metaphor, which pictorially maps
features of one thing onto something else. In the 2008
campaign, visual metaphor could reinforce cultural stereo-
types of women and African American men. Both groups
have historically been defined by their visible physical
characteristics. When Republicans accused Obama of
calling Palin a pig, they pointed out that in an earlier
speech, Palin had said the difference between “hockey
moms” (a label she embraced) and pit bulls was “lipstick.”
Wearing lipstick as she spoke, Palin was seeking a new way
to re-frame the stereotype of “beauty without substance,”
working with visual metaphor. At the same time, the claim
that Obama had called Palin a pig may have been
reinforced by another sort of frame: that of the crudely
aggressive or “uppity” black man insulting a white woman.
That frame was reinforced by visual metaphor when a
plethora of images representing Obama as ape-like surfaced
at anti-Obama rallies and on web sites. “Emotions are far
more ancient than cognitive processes” (Wilson 2002, 42),
and the perception of racial difference is a strong trigger of
in-group/out-group emotional responses in people (Hogan
2009). Regardless of whether or not one makes a
categorical assertion, both discursive and non-discursive
rhetoric can have an impact that transcends one’s conscious
motives or stated intentions. Indeed, we regularly discount
the precise language others use when the factors of cultural
context, framing, image (including auditory image, such as
tone of voice), and our evolved capacity for biases combine
to make us discern or suspect what an analogy maker
“really” meant to say. Because today’s culture bombards
our students with non-discursive representational forms, it’s
especially important to teach the analysis of such forms
(Murray 2009). For these reasons, our course embraces all
figures of speech, including simile, and all metaphorical
representations, including visual metaphor, as “fair game”
for analysis (to use an animal metaphor of our own).
I Am an Animal
What, then, might be the different metaphorical meanings
and consequences of an assertion that humans are, or are
not, animals? To address this question, we need to
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recognize that to say “Humans are animals” is quite
different from saying that rats are rodents or figs are fruits.
Any assertion about humans automatically allows for the
phrase “I am” to replace “Humans are.” Yet when
classifying themselves, humans normally use “I am” to
assert categorial identity. Categorial identity refers to the
symbolic ways in which humans define themselves in
relation to a group, ostensibly (though not always in
practice) adhering to the group’s values and norms, or
fulfilling one or more roles within the group (Hogan 2009).
Linguistically, the identity can be expressed as a categorical
assertion: I am a Baptist; I am an American; I am a
Republican. Unlike “Figs are fruit,” these statements have a
much greater potential to be interpreted differently according
to both the specific context and the sociocultural situatedness
of the speaker or listener. When former President Ronald
Reagan lay on the operating table just prior to having a bullet
removed from his lung, he told the surgeon “I hope you’re a
Republican.” The surgeon, a liberal Democrat, replied,
“We’re all Republicans today.” From the context, we can
deduce that metaphorically, the surgeon was affirming his
identity as a healer and member of a civilized society in which
political opponents must never become mortal enemies. Yet
even in less dramatic contexts, different people assign
different meanings to the assertion “I am a Republican.”
Statements of categorial identity are inescapably cultural.
I Am Not an Animal
Once we understand the importance of identity as cultural,
it becomes clearer why the equation of humans with
animals is threatening, for a major function of culture itself
may be to enable humans to differentiate themselves from
animals. This is proposed by the authors of an article
entitled: “I Am Not an Animal: Mortality Salience, Disgust,
and the Denial of Human Creatureliness” (Goldenberg et al.
2001). Human beings have the intelligence to be aware of
their own inevitable deaths. According to the terror
management theory, “a great deal of human behavior can
be understood as an attempt to gain psychological equa-
nimity in the face of this awareness” (428). One way
humans do this is by engaging in behaviors “that serve, at
least in part, to deny or minimize our commonalities with
other animals” (427). Many cultural rituals, “rules and
dictates” surround the appearance and functions of the
body, which is “a particular problem” because it “serves as
a reminder of our animal limitations” (428).
The study remains inconclusive, however, with respect
to how much or even whether such distancing from animals
is an effective solution to the problem of anxiety associated
with our awareness of death. The very conceptualization of
our loss of corporeal control as our “animal nature,” with
the latter term given purely negative connotations, is itself
an animal metaphor that may be culturally specific. The
authors point out: “Some cultures go to extreme lengths to
distance themselves from animals, whereas others seem
more ‘at one with nature’” (Goldenberg et al. 2001, 433).
These metaphors of distance and closeness may influence,
rather than merely reflect, the attitudes we have about
nature and ourselves as part of nature. When humans
describe themselves metaphorically as being “above and
beyond animals,” the word “animal” itself becomes
metaphorical. As a noun, it only ever designates all non-
human species, in ordinary usage (Derrida 2008), while as
an adjective it refers to behaviors, needs, or capacities
(cognitive or physical), usually deemed inferior, that are
presumably found primarily or much more markedly in
non-human beings (Burgat 2006).
To the extent that we metaphorize our corporeal condition
as our “animal” nature, we may be denying our fundamental
affiliation with (other) animals in ways that actually increase
our anxiety and wall us off from life-sustaining attitudes of
connectedness: “By clinging to sources of self-esteem or
one’s cultural (political, social, or religious) worldview,
human beings can begin to escape their existential burden.
However, one consequence of seeking a higher more
meaningful existence is that any reminder of our corporeal
condition is threatening” (Goldenberg et al. 2001, 428).
Such a consequence seems more likely if one’s cultural
worldview radically excludes animals and corporality as
threats to meaningful existence.
Are we Animals? Literature as a Play-Space
for Exploring Human–Animal Identity
Any assertion such as “Humans are animals” is context-
specific. In a non-scientific context, the assertion could be
construed to mean that human beings are driven by instinct
and prone to violence and thus not significantly different
from other creatures. Our pretentions to culture and
meaning, from that standpoint, would be reducible to a
thin veneer and could not change the substance of our being
any more than, say, lipstick on a pig. In a scientific context,
the statement “Humans are animals” could be construed to
mean that humans are members of the Animal Kingdom
with traits we share with other animal species because we
all evolved from common ancestors. It would not constitute
an attempt to deny any and all distinctions between humans
and non-human species. Yet even that prospect can be
disturbing to humans when we experience new scientific
evidence as a challenge to our identities and cultural
worldviews. At such times, people may turn to imaginative
literature in order to explore in less threatening ways the
problem of human–animal identity.
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A work of imaginative literature cannot be reduced to a
categorical assertion about human beings, scientific or
otherwise. Fiction neither affirms nor denies, but operates
rather in the realm of “What if?” It is a form of make-believe
with rules whose pleasures include thinking, wondering,
imagining, and experiencing connectedness with other
humans who share the literary experience. Instead of
asserting “humans are animals,” literature can allow us to
experiment with questions such as: Are we animals? What
are different ways to interpret that question, and what would
be their consequences? What metaphors might best reconcile
our need to confront scientific reality with our need to lead a
meaningful existence, which may have been framed as a life
that is above and beyond animals?
Through the study of specific works of literature, we can
develop skills for understanding how animal metaphors
mediate our identity and relationship with nature. But
unlike a traditional literature course that would do so by
referring only to theories of culture and identity that ignore
evolutionary theory, or even treat it as counter to such aims,
our course integrates literary study with evolutionary
psychology and cognitive science.
Literature and Human Universals
One central concept that we use to help understand human
behavior in the context of making and partaking of
narrative is the universal. A universal is any trait, behavior,
or characteristic that is shared by all humans (Brown 1991).
The assertion of anything as a human universal is to
predict, in evolutionary terms, that the universal is either a
shared derived trait for humans alone or for humans and
some cluster of the species most closely related to us. The
empirical test of a human universal is to show that it occurs
in all humans; hence, much of the evidence for universal
traits comes from anthropology (Brown 2000). The pres-
ence of universals across cultures is often used as proof of
the feature being evolved, although, strictly speaking, the
trait must ultimately be shown to have a genetic basis in
order to be a candidate for evolutionary homology, the
special similarity of shared ancestry.
Human universals are not “predictors” of human
behavior in particular situations or cultures. Our minds are
“loose confederations of parts” (Haidt 2006, 22), and
though we have many tendencies, different ones can get
activated at the same time or at different times. Environ-
ment, including the cultural environment, also exerts a
powerful influence on individuals, from the level of gene
expression to ways of behaving. In the words of Ellen
Dissanayake (1996): “Human nature consists of evolved
innate dispositions or tendencies that cultures then mold,
regulate, and elaborate” (231). Nonetheless, artistic activity,
once regarded by most people as “purely cultural,” and as that
which elevates humans above animals (Goldenberg et al.
2001), has its roots in evolution (Tooby and Cosmides 2001).
As an artistic activity, literature, understood in Darwinian
terms, is a human universal, as are some specific literary
devices. Hernadi (2001) explains that a Darwinian idea of
“literature” encompasses a range of transactions that “challenge
and thus enhance our brains’ vital capacities for expression,
communication, representation and signification” (56). Our
penchant and skill for such transactions, which include
storytelling, dramatic rituals, role-playing, and chanting,
probably grew from “protoliterary experiences”which enabled
early humans “to outdo their less imaginative rivals” (Hernadi
2001, 56). The requisite cognitive skills “enabling the
prehistoric emergence of oral literature” could have been
“byproducts of primate adaptations initially serving nonliterary
functions” (Hernadi 2001, 62). Our early ancestors enjoyed
“imaginative flights of protoliterary experience,” which
accelerated our evolution as literary animals. These “proto-
dramatic, protolyric and protonarrative” (Hernadi 2001, 62–
63) activities may in turn have helped strengthen certain skills
for non-literary purposes. Thus, alliteration may playfully
exercise our evolved ability to discern phonemes and respond
to patterns (Boyd 2009).
Literature and Cognitive Universals
As a primate adaptation, cognitive universals are particu-
larly important to the study of literature because they, as a
cluster of related features that all humans share, allow us to
know how someone else’s mind is likely to be operating.
Some cognitive universals identified by Brown (1991)
include metaphor, jokes, classification, empathy, language,
magic, myths, narrative, planning, poetry, pretend play,
snakes (wariness of), and symbolism. All of these engage
our cognitive abilities. The better one is at knowing
cognitive universals, either explicitly or implicitly, then
the better one can be at “getting inside other people’s
heads.” Universals, as a suite of cognitive abilities, are thus
the biological basis for a theory of mind. Theory of mind is
the ability of one individual to guess or attribute the mental
states of another, and this ability is thought to be essential
in human and interspecies communication (Premack and
Woodruff 1978).
Cognitive universals give writers the scaffolding for
guessing what a reader will understand and how the reader
will do so. Readers, in turn, use cognitive universals
implicitly to “get inside the heads” of writers or characters
the writer depicts (Zunshine 2006). Thus, the analysis of
making and partaking of stories seeks to make explicit the
universal cognitive processes and how they undergird not
only communication but, specifically, persuasion, manipu-
Evo Edu Outreach (2011) 4:52–63 57
lation, and the building of “realistic” fantasy. Universals
allow humans to interact through make-believe with rules.
Why Literature is So Often about Humans
and/or Animals
To emphasize that literary activity probably grew from
faculties we share with other primates, the course presents
various aspects of human emotional and social life as part
of an animal–human evolutionary continuum. We do this
even to explain why literary works themselves are so often
about humans and/or animals. Gossip, for instance, is a
social bonding experience thought to have replaced primate
grooming (Dunbar 1996). Gossip serves other important
functions, such as helping us to keep track of cheaters or
learn of new opportunities (Pinker 1997). Whether in the
form of gossip or fiction, stories engage our social
monitoring instincts (Boyd 2009). We are inclined to care
about the life choices other people make and to compare
them with our own; to get emotionally caught up in stories of
their conundrums; to want to discuss them and, sometimes,
to let our passionate involvement drive on a discussion that
has exhausted any other rational purpose. The question as to
whether or not we are animals may arise from our inherent
curiosity about other members of our species.
We also have an innate tendency to notice and pay
attention to animals. This could be another reason why
animals so very often figure in works of literature and get
noticed on the cinema screen, along with any kind of
“animated” figure. As shown so far, our rationale for
focusing on animal metaphors has included the fact that we
use metaphor to conceptualize ourselves as animals/non-
animals in a variety of social, cultural, and political
situations. Indeed, our focus on animals may be another
automatic and evolved module. New et al. (2007) proposed
that “The human attention system evolved to reliably
develop certain category-specific selection criteria, including
a set designed to differentially monitor animals and humans”
(16598). They tested this “animate monitoring” hypothesis
by asking human participants to detect changes in visual
scenes presented to them on a computer. Depending on the
image, an animal or building might disappear. The kind of
object determined the speed at which humans could detect
the change in the scene: humans and animals were detected
faster than a variety of objects, both fixed and movable.
New et al. (2007) interpreted these experimental results
as follows: “The results herein implicate a visual monitor-
ing system equipped with ancestrally derived animal-
specific selection criteria. This domain-specific subsystem
within visual attention appears well designed for solving an
ancient adaptive problem: detecting the presence of human
and non-human animals and monitoring them for changes
in their state and location” (16603). We test this hypothesis
in our course in a slightly different way. Students are briefly
shown images, only some of which contain animals. They
are asked to write down their first impression of each
image. For example, they are shown a picture of dramat-
ically counterposed ice floes and open water. A small dark
bird, making up less than two percent of the surface of the
image, was visible flying over the ice. According to the
animate monitoring hypothesis, most humans would auto-
matically detect the bird over non-animate ice or sea. Most,
but not all, students write “bird.”
Approaches to Analyzing Texts: Thematic Universals
and Literary Universals
As students learn to analyze metaphors in literary texts,
they continue to learn evolutionary theories of human and
non-human animal behavior, emotion and cognition. This
helps them recognize literary animal metaphors as partic-
ular frames and to speculate on their purposes and effects
from an evolutionary perspective. Toward that goal, we
devised an approach to analyzing literary texts that
distinguishes “thematic universals” from “literary univer-
sals.” Thematic universals are human universals that are
engaged thematically by a literary text. Thus, thematic
universals (to name only two) in Romeo and Juliet include
attachment and the formation of an in-group distinguished
from out-groups.
“Literary universal” designates various story practices,
the wide range of social functions they may fulfill, and the
cognitive, emotional, or sensory effects these practices may
have on the reader. A plot development that draws upon our
universal tendency to assume causal connection between
two events that occur in succession (the logical fallacy of
post hoc ergo propter hoc) is a literary universal. Poetic
repetition and variation, alliteration, rhythm, and rhyme are
just some literary universals that emerged from other
adaptations. Poetic meter, for instance, exercises our
capacity for synchronization, an adaptation thought to
promote cohesion and cooperation in human groups (Boyd
2009). Thus, poetic meter and the practice of singing or
reciting aloud in groups are both literary universals.
That thematic and literary universals interact and combine
to generate a poem’s meaning can be demonstrated with
Langdon Smith’s 1906 poem, “Evolution” that begins:
When you were a tadpole and I was a fish
In the Paleozoic time,
And side by side on the ebbing tide
We sprawled through the ooze and slime,
Or skittered with many a caudal flip
Through the depths of the Cambrian fen,
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My heart was rife with the joy of life,
For I loved you even then.
Subsequent stanzas take the “I” and “You” through a
series of metamorphoses as the poem traces human
evolution from amphibians to creatures swinging in “jungle
trees,” to animal-painting cave dwellers, until they reach
their present moment dining “at Delmonico’s.” Thematic
universals in the poem include attachment (it is a love
poem) and collective identity since the “I” and “You” figure
in an epic tale of all humanity. Since fear of death is a
human universal and our working assumption is that
humans often distance themselves from animals to manage
such fear, we propose anxiety about being animals, induced
by evolutionary theory, as an underlying preoccupation of
the poem. One way the poem grapples with such anxiety is
by establishing a notion of progress. Humans may be
animals, but “we” were once much less interesting and
more disgusting than today. Our ancestors did not make art
and lived in “ooze and slime,” an image that evokes viscous
substances universally considered disgusting because of
their potential to contain harmful microorganisms (Haidt et
al. 1997; Pinker 1997). Another way is through the use of
poetic rhyme and meter, thought to promote positive
feelings of social harmony and a sense of group purpose.
In his work on religion and group selection, Wilson (2002)
has shown that such feelings better enable a group to
compete with other groups. We have the students read this
stanza aloud to experience group chanting. We then have
them watch a YouTube video of “Snowball,” a dancing
cockatiel, to emphasize that when it comes to the arts, we
humans have not left other species entirely behind.
Narrative as Extended Metaphor: Balzac’s
Passion in the Desert
Entire narratives can be metaphorical when they serve the
purpose of expressing one story in terms of a different story
(Burke 2003). Craib (2004) proposes that when an
experience is too disturbing, a preferred “cover story” can
keep the full force of trauma at bay. The story constitutes a
“multi-layered metaphor” for an experience that is “current
but cannot be articulated in any other way” (Craib 2004,
69). This idea of narrative as extended metaphor is
consonant with misattribution theory, which Hogan (2003)
uses to explain why we respond emotionally to stories.
Hogan proposes that fiction activates emotional memo-
ries, but we misattribute these feelings because our
attentional focus is on the events of the literary work
(Hogan 2003). This misattribution is explained, in part, by
simulation theory. Behavioral and neurological evidence
indicates that humans mentally simulate—as part of their
representational machinery constructing the activities of the
narrative—sensations, movements, and feelings (for review,
see Barsalou, 2008). Because simulation is a fundamental
process in reasoning and thought, each reader automatically
infers from a text an initial chain of spatiotemporal “events”
that may or may not correspond to the simulation chain of
another reader or the “intent” of the author. Thus,
misattribution is part of the cognitive process, an inferential
system with unavoidable indeterminacy since it depends on
individual factors.
Misattribution and simulation theory shed light on why
we might speak of a text’s “affective content” even though
we know quite well that actual emotions are not really “in”
the words on the page. Such theories also help explain a
reader’s emotional identification with a story’s protagonist
(Hogan 2003). The text’s eliciting conditions trigger a
simulation process. What makes a particular text “emotion-
ally powerful” may be its ability to mimic the pattern and
process by which we automatically simulate. This is why
we speak of emotion being “in” a story.
We apply misattribution theory to Balzac’s 1830 story,
Passion in the Desert. Written in the wake of the
discoveries and theories of Cuvier, Buffon, Geoffroy, and
Lamarck, in which Balzac took a lively interest, Passion
circumvents direct engagement with the question of
animals’ commonalities with humans, raised in its first
section, by switching in its second section to the story of
one man’s struggle to survive in a distant land. The first-
person narrator and his female companion are just leaving
the menagerie of Henri Martin (1793–1882), famous in
Balzac’s time for performing animal acts, usually with big
cats. The narrator claims that an ex-soldier told him a story
that will prove it’s wrong to think animals are without
feelings like ours. The woman is eagerly curious, so he
sends her a written account of the soldier’s story, which
constitutes the second section.
The soldier has gotten stranded alone in the desert during
Napoleon’s 1798 Egyptian campaign. After escaping from
Maghrebi nomads, he seeks refuge in a cave, only to
discover that he is sharing his new abode with a leopard.
Surprisingly, the leopard responds with affection when he
caresses her. He calls her “Mignonne,” the name of a
former, knife-brandishing mistress who was violently
jealous. The two of them form a sustained and intimate
bond until one day the soldier admires an eagle soaring
overhead, causing the leopard to growl with what the
soldier imagines is jealousy. He scratches Mignonne’s head,
admiring the beauty of her hindquarters. Here, the written
account ends in suspension points. We are reminded that
it’s a story within a story when the human female character
demands to know what happened next, thus inaugurating
the third and final section of the Balzac tale. Resuming the
account verbally, the narrator quotes the soldier’s statement
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that the leopard very suddenly turned around, perhaps
because the soldier had hurt her, and caught his leg in her
teeth. Fearing for his life, he killed her with his dagger.
When members of his regiment finally located him, he was
still weeping.
The embedded narrator and foreign setting remove
nineteenth-century readers several times from potentially
threatening real-world scientific questions of the day
concerning how to classify humans in relation to animals.
This is not just because Balzac’s story is a work of fiction.
Even within the story, the reader is prevented from
pretending that the soldier’s report is accurate, for the love
story itself hinges on the soldier-narrator’s tendency to
create fictions. He transforms the leopard into a charming
and bejeweled human “princess” or “courtesan” wearing
“bracelets round her feet” and “black rings” on her tail. The
narrative of mutual romantic love may serve as a “cover
story” for overwhelming trauma, including, perhaps, the
trauma of having sexual feelings for an animal.
Thus, the human universals of misattribution and
metaphor function both at the thematic and meta-levels of
Balzac’s tale. The soldier’s narration is just ambiguous
enough to suggest that his belief in mutual love may have
been delusional, originating in a desperate need for
companionship, assuming the story’s first narrator did not
invent the entire episode. It is riveting for readers of the
story who identify with the soldier and are weighing the
consequences of the situation in the hope of a positive
outcome. Within the play-space of fiction, readers can
safely experiment with various conceptual blends, feeling
fear and sadness for the soldier. They can ponder the
question of what is true and what is imagined, without
confronting head-on the possibility that humans and big
cats share feelings of attachment because of a shared
evolutionary heritage.
The Place of Animal Metaphors
Ecocriticism has been pursued as the study of the
relationship between literature or other representational
forms and the physical environment; between humans and
the natural world in literature; or as literary criticism based
on an ecological perspective. Though more recently it has
focused on how humans perceive, behave, or respond to
nature and environmental issues, Easterlin (2004) observes
that ecocriticism lacks a methodology. Animals and animal
metaphors, but not humans, most commonly populate our
conception of “the environment,” according to Easterlin.
Thus, for most people, “the environment” becomes another
metaphor to reinforce the nature/culture binary, just like the
animal/people binary. Under these circumstances, ecocriti-
cism risks becoming little more than an “attitude,” free of
the theoretical grounding that a coherent field of inquiry
would require (Easterlin 2004).
In response to conceptions of the environment as human-
less nature, Buell (1999) and others have developed the
concept of “place,” a word that, Easterlin (2004) explains,
“conjoins perception, cultural mediation, and apparent
physical location” (11). Unlike Buell, however, Easterlin
stresses the importance of recognizing that “humans share
prototypical patterns of negotiating the world” (Easterlin
2004, 12). Place is continuously constructed by humans
through their evolved perceptual machinery. Place begins
for each individual with attachments to their first “other”
being, mother, and continues through time with changing
social relationships, cultural constructions, and identity.
Place depends on cognitively mediated experiences that are
tied to our interactions as animals with other beings in the
physical world.
Easterlin’s “place” strikingly parallels what Cosmides
and Tooby (1997) have called the environment of evolu-
tionary adaptedness (EEA): “EEA is not a place or time. It
is the statistical composite of selection pressures that caused
the design of an adaptation. Thus the EEA for one
adaptation may be different from that for another.” In the
same way, “place” is not a place (in the standard sense) or
time. It includes the composite of historical factors that
caused the identity of a person. To extend the analogy,
personal identity is a kind of individual adaptedness, a
narrative created in response to “place”.
We use Easterlin’s particular concept of place, which
incorporates research in emotion and cognition, to analyze
animal metaphors in Lavinia Currier’s 1998 film adaptation
(Currier 1998) of Balzac’s Passion in the Desert. Currier’s
film is a sympathetic portrayal of the French protagonist’s
struggle to create “place” in a new physical environment
mediated socially in the only way he finds possible:
through his relationship with a leopard companion. Yet
the film is critical of the imperialist and anthropocentric
attitudes that motivated Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt to
begin with, and which the soldier displays in the film.
These attitudes, the film implies, are environmentally
disrespectful.
Whereas the desert is a near-empty “nothingness” in the
Balzac story, Currier’s film makes viewers aware that the
desert is a live ecosystem in which, as Easterlin explains,
each organism has a position. We see close-ups of reptiles,
insects, and other mammals. The film also shows that the
desert constitutes a culturally constructed “place” for its
Maghrebi inhabitants. Balzac only depicts the Maghrebi
nomads as enemy captors whom the soldier labels
“animals.” In contrast, the film shows scenes of Arab
nomads engaged in the duties and rituals of their everyday
life, having mastered the challenges of survival in a barren
land. The calm with which they lead their camels is
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sharply contrasted with the desperation of French army
soldiers unable to control their horses on the dunes, or
even to keep themselves and their horses alive as water
supplies dwindle. The nomadic culture is, to borrow a
phrase from Easterlin (2004, 11), “part and parcel of a
specific natural setting.”
Early on, the soldier enters one of the nomad’s tents
uninvited and violates cultural norms by ripping off an
Arab woman’s veil, after which she scratches his face. One
may interpret this as a visual metaphor not only for the
French invasion of Egypt but also for the fiction that the
French soldier attempts to impose on the female leopard.
Currier modifies the ending of the Balzac story. In the film,
when the soldier sees his French comrades arriving, he is
anxious for the leopard to remain where she is and tries to
tie her up. The enraged leopard attacks him so fiercely that
he is obliged to stab her. The last shot of the movie is of the
grief-stricken solitary soldier carrying the dead leopard in
his arms through the desert.
Hence, the film uses new animal metaphors of its own to
call attention to the perils of anthropocentrism, ignorance of
cultural difference, and lack of respect for all “others”:
other humans, non-human animals, non-French territory. It
does so with scenes that trigger our subcortical emotive
arousal and a protagonist whom we can relate to affectively.
The most poignant emotion is attachment. To heighten the
sense of attachment, the film uses a real leopard, so that we,
as watchers, are first frightened as we put ourselves in the
soldier’s place. When the leopard doesn’t strike, we lower
our defenses and begin to attach ourselves to the attachment
that is forming between the soldier and the leopard.
The film’s spectators can empathize with the soldier’s
need for attachment and watch how the rituals of playing,
sleeping, and eating that he shares with the leopard allow
for the desert to become, for him, a new humanly
meaningful “place,” mediated through his relationship with
the anthropomorphized leopard. Yet the film never allows
the viewer’s perception of the leopard or desert to become
indistinguishable from the soldier’s own constructions.
Affective engagement and understanding of our human
nature is, according to Easterlin, necessary to promote
environmental concern. Yet the film forces us to be
conscious of the multitude of “other” natures, “out there,”
which our fictions are powerless to control. It does not let
us stick our heads in the sand.
Wrestling with Metaphors: Assignments
The biggest pedagogic challenge of this course was to find
ways to connect with and engage students of many
different majors. Even though this was a topics course
required for the environmental studies major, it was open to
students across the curriculum. Undeclared majors along
with majors in English, Italian, biology, cognitive science,
drama & film, history, women’s studies, and environmental
studies were enrolled. With such a wide range of interests
and backgrounds, we created assignments that were meant
to serve interests both within the larger context of the
course and the specific interests of the environmental
studies major.
To lay the groundwork for metaphors, the first assign-
ment was “hunting for metaphors.” After reading and
discussing Glucksberg’s (2003) behavior experiments on
metaphor recognition, we asked students to seek out
metaphors. The hunting grounds were general and scientific
journalism. We asked students to predict, and justify, which
hunting ground they expected to yield more metaphors and
to test their prediction by developing an explicit search
methodology. Most students expected the scientific jour-
nalism to use fewer metaphors because they assumed that
scientific language would be more “objective,” i.e., more
literal and less figurative. Many were surprised at how hard
it was to find obvious metaphors of the categorical assertion
type defined by Glucksberg.
The second assignment was to write an essay. We asked
students to begin using their scientific readings as a lens
through which to view literature:
Explain how two or more of the assigned non-literary
readings inform your reading of either Honoré de
Balzac’s Passion in the Desert (1830) or Guy de
Maupassant’s Story of a Farm Girl (1890). In addition
to examining your chosen story’s content in relation
to the non-literary readings, your paper should at
some point also address the experience or function
itself of reading and/or inventing and circulating a
story, in relation to our cognitive functions, our
existence as social primates, or other aspects of our
evolutionary heritage.
One student wrote:
Through this story, Balzac explores the possibility
that wild animals traditionally seen as distant can rise
to the status of human-like companions in the right
circumstances. This assertion can be analyzed using
the ideas of evolutionary psychology such as the
association of animals with disgust and mortality, the
inclination to sympathize closely with familiar ani-
mals like pets, the tendency to form in- and out-
groups in dire situations and the concept of fair play.
The third assignment asked students to take theory, both
scientific and literary, that they had learned and create an
experiential understanding of the local environment:
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Drawing upon Easterlin’s idea of “place,” make
observations about one or more animals that are part
of this particular place where we all regularly meet
and work together: the Vassar campus. Focus on
Vassar as a place mediated by culture and people, yet
populated with animals, even if you also take into
account the Hudson Valley in which Vassar is
situated.
Given Easterlin’s emphasis on “place” as a cognitively
mediated perception of the world, we expected the
responses to be as varied as the students, even though they
had developed a similar set of analytic tools. What we
found most fascinating were experiences that ranged from
the anthropocentric to the abstract. All, however, were
conscious of the humans-as-animals perspective.
The fourth assignment, a final project, was scaffolded
into a proposal, an oral presentation, and a final paper. The
overall goal of the project was straightforward: “Use our
theories and methods to analyze a narrative system (written,
spoken, or performed) that uses or addresses animals in
some essential way.” Given that a wide-open project like
this can be intimidating, we provided a set of non-
exhaustive examples:
1. A topic in your own discipline.
2. A topic related to a personal interest.
3. One of the two films we watched: “Grizzly Man”
(Herzog 2005) or “Passion in the Desert.”
4. Environmental connections or ecological theory.
5. Self-deception and the media→climate change.
6. Create an “animal metaphors” syllabus, complete with
readings.
7. Take on a theory that you’ve encountered (literary,
cognitive, evolutionary psychology).
8. Human behavior or humans-as-animals.
9. Feminist theory.
10. Formal critique of any reading.
One of the most inventive projects used evolutionary
theories of self-deception in an analysis of commercials
warning about global warming and then warning about
global warming alarmists. A commercial, produced in the
UK, was set as a bedtime story for a little girl. Animals
cavorted while humans drove cars that polluted and caused
the oceans to rise and the animals to cry. The anti-alarmists
used the same scenes but added a different voice-over, one
in which the evil alarmists were causing young children to
have nightmares and accept a lower standard of living. The
analysis pointed out the use of “place” as the bedroom, the
setting for the story, and the use of a narrative with
expected beginning, tension, and end, that engaged animals
as metaphors for nature, innocence, and childhood. The
anti-alarmist response used the same animals as metaphors
for freedom and independence.
A final exam was also given that asked for written
responses to five questions. Returning to the opening theme
of the course, one question was this:
What is meant when we say that some humans are
‘animals’ or ‘like animals?’ Use course definitions of
metaphor to address this question, but also give one or
more examples from one or more course readings that
explain why humans find it easy to ‘see themselves’ in
animals, or to see animals in themselves.
Conclusion
Humans use animal metaphors to frame their ongoing
relationship with the environment and their place in an
evolutionary continuum. Animal metaphors are extremely
powerful communication tools because they are automati-
cally processed, focus on entities to which we preferentially
attend, and tap into the wealth of thematic and literary
universals that drive narratives. Narrative literature and film
rely on evolved linguistic reconstruction processes that
allow story to be reconstructed from fractured pieces of
discourse. Humans are metaphorizing animals. We believe
that the concept of “animal metaphors” can facilitate
exchange of knowledge and ideas between the humanities
and the natural sciences while helping us live productively
with nature and our own human nature.
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